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and :\L\__"'\ G_\ILEY. Trustees of the S\liTH L\'\0
CO:\IP_\:\Y. and S:\IITH L\:\0 CO:\lPA'\Y. a
corporation.
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ALBERT S. \\-HEEL WRIGHT. Trustee in Bankruptcy
of John K. Smith. Bankrupt.
lntenenor and Respondent.
S:\IITH L\_\-0 CO:\IPA:\Y. a corporation.

Plaintiff.
vs.
:\1. :\1. JOH:\SO_\-. ReceiYer of :\ielson-Burton Company. formerly a co-partnership composed of A. J.
:\ielson and Charles S. Burton_ CHARLES D.
:\IOORE and \\-ILSE A. :\IELSO:\.

~ o. G1 U~

Dejendunts.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

.J. D. SKEEN,
E ..J. SKEEN,
Atturneys for A[Jpellants.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
W. A. NIElSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JOHN W. SMITH and J. CAMERON SMITH, E. LINCOL~ SJ\DTIL POLLY SMITH, JOHN W. SMITH
and MA.X GAILEY. Trustees of the SMITH LAND
COMPA.NY, and SMITH LA!'l--o COMPANY, a

No.

6199

corporatio~

Defendants and Appellants,
ALBERT S. WHEELWRIGHT, Trustee in Bankruptcy
of John W. Smith, Bankrupt,
Intervenor and Respondent.
SMITH LA.ND COMPANY, a

corporatio~

Plaintiff,
vs.
M. M. JOHNSON, Receiver of Nielson-Burton Company, formerly a co-partnership composed of A. J.
Nielson and Charles S. Burton, CHARLES D.
MOORE and WILSE A. NIELSON,
Defendants.

No. 6198

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
The respondents' brief contains a sketchy statement
of facts which carefully omits all evidence which is dam-
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aging to them. No reference is made to the pages of the
transcript and the Abstract of Record as required by rule
Ten of the Rules of Practice of this Court. Many of the
statements are inaccurate and misleading and some find
no support in the record whatever. Other facts of vital
importance are not even mentioned.
The respondents' argument is based upon the assumption of the very thing which they are trying to prove,
namely: that the findings of fraud are sustained by the
evidence. After discussing several cases involving conveyances to corporations in fraud of creditors, none of
which are in point on the facts, it is said on page 17, that
John W. Smith transferred his property to the corporation; that after the transfer, he continued to live on the
land he had contracted to buy; that he was heavily indebted to his creditors and was being pressed for money
and that immediately after forming the corporation, the
charter was forfeited for non-payment of the franchise
tax. It is then concluded that there was a clear intent to
hinder, delay and defraud creditors. Admitting for the
purpose of the argument that all of these statements are
true, they do not show a fraudulent intent. The courts
hold that a transaction in which an insolvent debtor conveys to a corporation all of his property and receives in
exchange the stock of the corporation is not a fraudulent
conveyance unless it is shown that there was an actual
fraudulent intent. The rule is stated in an extensive note
on the subject in 85 A. L. R., page 140:
''Where the only circumstance relied upon as
furnishing the intent to delay or defraud creditors is
the fact that the debtor transferred his property to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a corporation in consideration of its stock, many
courts have refused to derlare the transaction fraudulent as having been entered into with intent to delay and defraud creditors, or one without eonsideration. Such tr~msfers are sustained, in the absence
of an actual intent to delay or defraud creditors,
which must be deduced fr~rn circumstances other
than the mere transfer iu consideration of stock.''
In the case of Sunderlin Y. Terry, 95 Conn. 713, 112
Atl642, a debtor conveyed his property to a corporation
organized by him, received stock for his property, borrowed money and pledged the stock, as security. The
creditors attacked the conveyance as fraudulent, but the
court refused to set it aside and after analyzing the evidence said:
''To organize a personal business into a corporation is altogether too common to raise any presumption of fraud.''
See also:
Jordan v. Lynch Land Company, 83 Ind. App. 33,
147 N. E. 318;
Gardner v. Haines, 19 S. D. 514, 104 N. W. 244;
Shumaker v. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87 N. W.
441;
Plant v. Billings-Drew Company, 127 Mich. 11, 86
N. W. 399;_
Thorpe v. Pennock Mere. Company, 99 Minn. 22,
180 N. W. 940;
Persse & B-Paper Works v. Willett, 19 Abb. Pr.
(N.Y.) 416;
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Byrnet & H. Dry Goods Company v. Willis Dann
Company, 23 S. D. 221, 121 N. W. 620, 29 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 589;
Bristol Bank & T. Company v. Jonesboro, 101
Tenn. 545, 48 S. W. 228 ;
Densmore Commission Company v. Shong, 98
Wis. 380, 74 N. W. 114.
Throughout the presentation of the facts and the argument, the respondents seek to give the impression that
in 1930 when the alleged fraudulent assignment occurred,
John W. Smith was the owner of valuable land which he
was seeking to keep away from creditors. The fact is
that Smith had a contract of purchase upon which he
had defaulted to the extent of $1208.91 besides interest
in 1929. He was in default on taxes for three year.s and
had received several letters threatening cancellation prior
to 1930. ( Abs. 89, 101.) In the fall of 1930 he was faced
with a principal payment of $2,000.00 together with interest at Seven percent and he was without money to meet
the payments. The contract was subject to forfeiture and
no doubt would have been cancelled but for the timely assistance of J. Cameron Smith. At the time of the assignment, Smith was valiantly seeking to keep the contract of
purchase in good standing. In October, Smith owed a
judgment to W. A. Nielson for $54.90 and one to Bertha
Skeen for $100.00. Another judgment for $1278.92 in
favor of W. A. Nielson was in 1930 being appealed to the
Supreme Court and a stay bond was on file. The ·sureties
qualified before Judge McKinney and Smith expected to
reverse the case in the Supreme Court. ( Abs. 93.95.) The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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respondents contend that this srheme of inrorporating
was not to provide a means of getting family help to
save a $10,000.00 rontrart but was all devised for the
purpose of defrauding rreditors of $154.90. The same
argument was made in the rase of Sunderlin v. Terry,
supra, the court said :
'·To organize a personal business into a corporation is altogether too common to raise any presumption of fraud. Moreo\er, as an ordinary business
proposition it seems improbable that one having
$10,000 of property should transfer the "\vhole to escape the payment of the small sum of $150 to $160,
and retain in the bank half enough cash to pay even
that, so that $80.00 was the claimed motive for the
fraudulent transfer.''
There is no evidence that the sureties on the appeal
bond refused to pay or that any effort was made to exhaust the security for payment of the judgment for
$1278.92. The fact of the matter is that W. A. Nielson
didn't collect the judgment in 1930 because he was looking
for larger ''game'' than $54.90. He was willing to stand
by until the contract of purchase was paid out by the
Smith Land Company with the idea of acquiring all of the
outstanding accounts and then attempting to get the land.
The respondents have cited a number of fraud cases, particularly those using such words as, ''parasitic growth, a
mass of fungus," etc., but W. A. Nielson and his predecessors did not hesitate to accept payments over a period
of many years from the ''fungus'' until the contract was
paid down to where there was an equity. It is argued
that the corporation was only the alter ego of John W.
Smith and the fact that the court found that J. Cameron
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Smith had paid $1,000.00 on the contract which was
credited on his stock account and the fact that he turned
to the corporation a tractor for which he testified he had
paid $1500.00 is entirely ignored. J. Cameron Smith was
not a judgment debtor and there is no evidence in the
record that he was interested in the slightest in defrauding creditors of John W. Smith and yet the trial court
made no effort to protect his interests as a stockholder
or otherwise.
The court found that J. Cameron Smith paid for his
stock but that all other shares, except John vV. Smith's,
were distributed to members of the family wholly without consideration. This finding is contrary to the uncontradicted testimony of John W. Smith that he was
indebted to his mother for $1,000.00 cash borrowed from
her, owed Clarence Smith" Seven Hundred odd dollars,"
owed E. Lincoln Smith $600.00 and also owed money to
S. M. Smith and Andrew Smith, a son. (Abs. 90.) This
was a family corporation and all of the members of the
family were cooperating with an elderly father to enable him to keep his ranch. For a similar situation see
the case of Shumaker vs. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87
N. W. 441. In that case, the debtor organized a corporation for the purpose of transferring to it certain land
which was heavily encumbered. Some of his relatives
including his wife and brother-in-law conveyed land to
the corporation and one near relative paid $1200.00 cash
for his stock. The debtor owed sums to unsecured creditors aggregating about $17,000.00 and the transfer was
attacked as fraudulent. The court refused to set the
transaction aside because there was consideration for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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transfers, namely: the stock, and there is no evidence of
fraudulent intent other than the transfer itself. The court
said:
"If the corporation were a mere scheme for the
purpose of concealing covin equity would look behind the curtain to discover the real purpose. It
is not denied that the other incorporators invested
money in the scheme and transferred property in
consideration of stock received. This they would
not have done had the transaction been as claimed
by the creditors and their representatives. We are
asked to say, however, that notwithstanding there is
no conflict in the evidence regarding the manner and
method of organization, the whole scheme was a
fraud and the witness should be disbelieved. This
we are not prepared to do. "When the facts disclosed are as consistent with honesty and good faith
as with fraud and deceit we must sustain the transaction.''

In Thorpe v. Pennock Mere. Company, 99 Minn. 22,
108 N. W. 440, the court said:
"In fact, as the partnership was insolvent the
parties may well have reasoned that the interests of
the creditors would be advanced by the organization of the corporation under conditions which would
render solvent the holders of the stock who were responsible for partnership debts.''

John W. Smith testified that some time earlier in October, 1930, he went t<> D. A. Skeen's office and told him
about the organization of the corporation and that he
had reserved stock for the payment of creditors. He said
that he offered to pay the W. A. Nielson and Bertha
Skeen claims in that way and D. A. Skeen referred him

7
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to Mr. Spence. He made the same proposition to Mr.
Spence, who, a few days later, notified him that the proposal would be rejected. (Abs. 79, 81, 83.)
The articles of incorporation show that 2, 799 shares
were reserved by John W. Smith, as trustee. D. A. Skeen
testified that he had never heard such a proposal and Ben
Spence testified that he had met John vV. Smith for the
first time in court at the trial. ( Abs. 91.)
On redirect examination, John vV. Smith said that he
met Spence in 1930 and had seen him a half a dozen
times since, twice in D. A. Skeen's office and further
that he had seen him when the sureties qualified on the
appeal bond. This testimony is corroborated by the order
with respect to the qualification of the sureties. (Abs. 95,
96.)
In answer to appellants' argument of estoppel
(pleaded in answer of Smith Land Company, Abs. 30),
the respondents contend;
(1)

That it is "far fetched,'' and

(2) That there could be no estoppel as against the
trustee in bankruptcy. (Res. Br., 29.) When an argument cannot be met, it is convenient to say it is "far
fetched'' but this bare .statement is no more convincing
than the argument that there is no basis for estoppel ''as
applied to the trustee in Bankruptcy.'' Apparently respondents believe that a trustee gets a bright new title to
all claims and that he enters the picture carrying the halo
of innocence. This, of course, is not the law. The trustee
merely steps into the shoes of the creditors and he takes
the claims subject to all of the infirmities incident to them
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the hands of the original creditors. In Remington on
Bankruptcy, last edition, Section 1509, it is said:

''It is well established that the effect of 70 e is to
clothe the trustee with no new or additional rights
other than those which a creditor would have possessed but simply puts him in the shoes of a creditor
as regards a fraudulent transaction subject to the
same limitations and disabilities that would have beset a creditor in the prosecution on his own behalf.''
Security Warehouse Company v. Hand, 206 U.S.
415, 51 L. ed. 1117, 27 S. Ct. 789;
Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 59 L. ed.
583, 35 S. Ct. 377 ;
Davis v. Willey, 263 Fed. 588.
Some startling inconsistencies in respondents' argument should be notic~d. It is pleaded in the complaint:
''That upon the entry of said judgment, execution was issued thereon and delivered to the Sheriff
of Box Elder County and said executions were duly
returned by the said Sheriff wholly unsatisfied and
the said judgments, nor any part thereof, have not
been paid.'' (Abs. 2.)

This, by the way, is omitted from the respondents'
resume' of the pleadings although the authorities hold
that to entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief in proceedings of this kind, there must be a showing that execution
has been issued and returned unsatisfied. It is next contended that the respondents and their attorneys had no
notice whatever of the return on execution until June,
1937-(Res. Br. 30) some two years after the complaint
was filed in which it is alleged that the execution in ques9
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tion was returned unsatisfied. This fancy dodging does
not carry conviction. If W. A. Nielson didn't know in
1935 that the execution had been returned unsatisfied in
1930, he perjured himself when he pleaded that it had
been returned unsatisfied. Yet, with the return showing
the fact of the transfer in 1930 in the possession of the
agent of the plaintiff-the sheriff-the following statement is made in the respondents' brief, page 32:
''There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
to show that the sheriff of Box Elder County ever
learned that the contract has been assigned to this
corporation or that Mr. S1nith transferred his property.''
This is a wishful statement. It is surprising that the
respondents would make it with the sheriff's return on
the record dated December 3, 1930, referring to the letter
of J.D. Skeen received by the sheriff on or about November 7, 1930, and attached to the return as an exhibit. The
letter is .set out in full in the abstract, pages 113-114.
Yet, as stated above, the respondents say there is not a
scintilla of evidence in the record showing that the sheriff
ever knew that the contract had been transferred. When
D. A. Skeen, attorney for respondents, was asked where
he got the information that the execution was returned
unsatisfied and was asked whether he got it from the
sheriff or his deputy, he said, ''I do not recall ever talking to the sheriff." (Abs. 107.) It will be noticed that
he did not deny ever talking with or hearing from the
deputy in 1930 when the return was dated. The rule is
well settled that notice to an agent is notice to the princiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pal regardless of the latter's actual knowledge if the information was received by the agent within the course of
his employment and "ithin the scope of his authority.
2 Mecham on Agency, Sec. 1803, et seq., :2 C. J. 859, and
numerous cases cited. It is also the law that notice to an
attorney at law is notice to his client. An additional case
on the subject of duty of making inquiry has come to the
writer's attention. It is closely in point and we believe
clearly states the rule.
Deering v. Holcomb, 26 Wash. 588, 67 P. 240, 561.
The uncontradicted evidence shows notice of the transfer to the sheriff, agent of the plaintiff, Bertha Skeen,
in the case in which the $100.00 judgment was procured
and under the familiar rules mentioned above, D. A.
Skeen, her attorney, and W. A. Nielson, his client and
Bertha Skeen, successor, had notice more than four years
before suit was instituted. The cause of action, if any
ever existed is clearly barred by the Statute of Limita-·
tions.
The respondents attempt to answer appellants' argument that the court erred in entering judgment in favor
of Wheelwright after he had been replaced as a party by
Turley by court order dated February 4, 1939, by saying
on page 33 of their brief that :
"The trustee, however, was not dismissed out of
the case, but continued through as a party to the
case and the final judgment was entered accordingly."
Apparently the word ''substituted'' which appears three
times in the order is misunderstood. Counsel must think
11"
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that when one person is substituted for another he becomes a sort of alternate and the court may at its convenience designate either party as judgment creditor.
This is, of course, absurd and is the usual result of .shifting positions to gain an advantage. Turley was used by
the respondents as a dummy with the idea of acquiring
Smith's equity in the property over and above the judgments. They caused him to be substituted for Wheelwright because he had bought the lawsuit from Wheelwright and succeeded to all of his rights. However, they
couldn't see any possibility of collecting the $1247.19
bankruptcy costs (which include some $750.00 attorneys
fee for D. A. Skeen) through Turley so they switched back
to Wheelwright and drew a decree in his favor although
the record is clear that he no longer has any interest in
the case. Since the assets, if any, of the bankrupt's estate
were sold to Turley for $500.00, the estate had money to
pay the expense of bankruptcy. It could be paid out of
the $500.00. It should be noted that the trial court found
that all of Smith's right, title and interest in the land
which he attempted to transfer in fraud of creditors was
sold to Turley and then the court entered judgment in
the Box Elder County case in favor of Wheelwright and
against Smith and the corporation.
There has been no attempt made to explain how the
state court can enforce payment of the expenses of the
bankruptcy court and no explanation is made of the fact
that the decrees of the trial court are dated April 3, 1939,
and the order of the bankruptcy court, which respondents
seek to enforce, is dated April11, 1939. When the decrees
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were entered, the bankruptcy order was not only not final,
but it had not even been made!

In the Salt Lake County case, the court made a decree
in favor of Wheelwright, who leas nel'er a party, requiring Smith and the Smith Land Company to pay the judgment and also the expenses of bankruptcy. The decree is
also in favor of John W. Smith, who was never a party,
requiring specific performance of the contract for his
benefit. It is interesting to note that the decree is also
in favor of the "fungus" corporation and provides for
delivery of a deed to it upon receipt of the $2433.88 which
was tendered by the Smith Land Company and by no one
else. The court also found that Turley (also not a party)
was the owner of the vendee's interest in the contract,
but nevertheless decreed specific performance to Smith
and the Smith Land Company. That part of the decree
which imposes liens upon the land and conditions in favor
of strangers to the suit is clearly erroneous and must be
stricken. The decree in the Box Elder County case must
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
J. D. SKEffiN,
E. J. SKEEN,
Atto'rneys for Appellants.
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